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Abstract 
Internationally, mega events have been used by cities to enhance their image and improve 
urban spaces. Cities may be viewed as commodities, particularly when local or national 
governments are making the pitch for hosting rights of such events. As a commodity, they 
need to sell themselves, often requiring some change in the way they look and perform. 
New Zealand’s hosting of the Rugby World Cup (RWC) in 2011 created an opportunity for 
New Zealand to carry out much-needed improvements to the image of the country, the main 
cities, and Auckland in particular.  Of the 48 World Cup games, 15 were held in Auckland, 
including the semi-finals and the final, as well as the opening and closing ceremonies for the 
event. The city required significant changes and improvements to local infrastructure, as 
well as expansion and upgrade of a number of venues, all within a relatively short space of 
time. This paper looks at some of the transformations that took place in Auckland in the lead 
up to the Rugby World Cup 2011, and explores the impacts of the event on planning 
processes and performance in the city. 
The paper first identifies the range of projects undertaken as part of the RWC upgrade in 
Auckland, and then focuses on the perceptions of seven industry representatives who were 
involved with key projects in the RWC development in Auckland. These individuals all 
participated closely in the planning and development processes of their respective projects. 
They have provided their reflections on how the RWC affected their projects, and lessons 
learnt in delivering within the context of such a mega event. The paper also briefly considers 
their perceptions of the social and economic impacts resulting from the RWC developments, 
and the opportunities lost and gained in the process. 
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1. Introduction 
Mega events are large scale one-off events, most commonly sports-focused (eg. 
Commonwealth or  Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup) but also extending to large trade or 
cultural festivals (e.g. World’s Fairs or Expos) which attract significant numbers of 
international participants and spectators, have a profile internationally beyond the region in 
which they are run, and generate significant global media coverage. Countries or cities bid to 
host mega events in an attempt to promote their locations and attract investors (Chalkley & 
Essex 1999). Mega events typically draw a large number of tourists to the host region and 
generate extensive publicity through media coverage of events, so bidding cities or countries 
are willing to make huge investments in hosting the event itself, and also make substantial 
investment to infrastructure related to the event.  
1.1 Mega events and urban development 
The use of mega events as a catalyst for urban development is an idea that has been 
adopted by many cities and nations in recent bids for hosting rights. Whereas in the past the 
focus for mega events has been on the perceived economic benefits from media 
involvement and resulting tourism and investment opportunities, many studies have found 
these difficult to quantify, and claimed returns have often been challenged (Dwyer, 2005). 
Where economic effects have been calculated, their impact has been shown to be small and 
short-term in most cases, and for a number of events the net economic outcome has been 
negative. Mega events have however been useful to stimulate urban development, and 
promoters increasingly frame their pitch in terms of the legacy of improvement and 
expansion that hosting such an event will deliver (Mills, 2013). Cities which may have found 
it difficult to justify spending money on ‘aspirational’ projects as part of their normal 
operations may use the guise of a mega event to support large capital expenditure. 
Internationally iconic buildings have resulted from various sporting events or festivals in 
some locations: the Eiffel tower in Paris, built for the 1889 World’s Fair; the original Wembley 
stadium in London, built for the British Empire Exhibition in 1924; the Maracana Stadium, 
built in Río de Janeiro for the 1950 FIFA World Cup; the Calatrava Tower in Barcelona, built 
for the 1992 Olympics; and more recently the ‘Birds Nest’ or Beijing National Stadium, built 
for the 2008 Olympics.  
Apart from creating opportunities for constructing new sports facilities, mega sporting events 
can create an opportunity to improve the environment of the wider urban environment 
(Malfas et al., 2004). The number of participants, officials, media and tourists that are 
associated with mega events require an efficient transport network, sophisticated media 
broadcast facilities, hotels, commercial centres and public spaces (Malfas et al 2004, 
Greene 2003, Hiller 2006). Beyond the development needs of an event, significant urban 
regeneration has also been hailed as a product of mega events, for example the inner city 
renewal of Atlanta, USA (1992 Olympics), social integration and infrastructure development 
in South Africa (FIFA World Cup 2010) and redevelopment of East London (2012 Olympics) 
Whether these regeneration projects have actually achieved their aims is far more 
controversial, however. 
  
1.2 The Rugby World Cup 2011 
The Rugby World Cup (RWC) is the third largest sporting event in the world, after the 
Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup (IRB, n.d.). New Zealand’s hosting of the RWC in 
2011 began in November 2005 when the NZ Rugby Union won their bid to host the event, 
allowing less than six years to prepare the country to host an event of an unprecedented 
scale. This required significant changes and improvements to local infrastructure (transport 
networks, leisure centres, roads and stadiums) and expansion and upgrade of a number of 
venues, all within a relatively short space of time. Auckland was particularly affected; 
although games were held in 12 venues around the country, two of these venues were in the 
Auckland region, and the opening and closing ceremonies, the semi-finals and the finals 
were all held in Auckland. 
2. Planning and processes 
Large scale developments brought about as part of a mega event are subject to strict 
deadlines, usually entailing “fast track decision making and implementation processes in 
order to ensure completion of projects on time” (Varrel & Kennedy 2001, p. 3). Because of 
this over-riding need for on-time completion, there is an increased risk that planning and 
processes leading to project delivery may infringe on existing legislation (planning 
regulations), environmental sustainability and democracy (lack of public consultation). 
Burbank (2002) argues that for a mega event to be successful it will need support from local 
government, local residents and the private sector. However, because of the scale of mega 
events and their influence on urban development, even when there is resistance to an event 
or to its associated projects, the public often ends up having very little input into the planning 
process. For example, some of the developments that took place prior to the FIFA World 
Cup 2010 in South Africa were deemed to be of national importance and the public were 
completely excluded from the decision making (Benit-Gbaffou, 2009).  
Mega events present a definite deadline for construction projects (venues and supporting 
infrastructure) and central and local government may use this as an excuse to forgo the 
usual application processes (public hearings, consents, environmental and social 
assessments) and fast track preferred projects to meet up with the deadlines (Malfas et al 
2004). Hiller (2006) adds that the process of using public funds or even private sector 
funding differs in comparison with the normal processes so deadlines can be met and that 
an event becomes a mega event for the city hosting it when it intervenes in the normal 
functioning of a city to mobilise resources for the event. 
In Auckland, various levels of local and central government became involved in the delivery 
process for the RWC at different stages of the lead-up, which included involvement in the 
development of the built environment. Table 1 sets out the timeline of relevant milestones 
leading up to the RWC 2011. 
  
Table 1 RWC 2011 planning timeline 
Date Event 
November 2005  NZRU wins bid to host RWC 2011 
June 2006  Rugby New Zealand 2011 Limited (RNZ 2011) established as a joint venture, limited 
liability company, based on a partnership between the Government and the NZRU. 
February 2007  RWC Co-ordination Office established as part of the Ministry of Economic Development 
(MED) to co-ordinate core Government services to support the tournament, including 
border control, security, transport and infrastructure. 
June 2007 Wynyard Quarter development began 
October 2007  Minister for Rugby World Cup appointed by NZ Government. 
May 2008  Eden Park upgrade began 
September 2009. “2011 Group” established by Government (a panel of advisers designated to work with 
RWC Ministers and the New Zealand 2011 Office) 
November 2010  Rugby World Cup 2011 Empowering Act passed to allow government intervention in 
standard planning processes. 
August 2011 Rugby World Cup 2011 opening ceremony  
2.1 The research 
In order to understand the impact of the RWC on the infrastructure of Auckland, and the 
associated planning and processes leading to its delivery, an exploration of the experiences, 
attitudes and perceptions of selected participants was carried out. Seven senior industry 
representatives were interviewed about the projects they were involved in that were linked to 
the RWC, and about the experiences of the industry more generally. Projects that were 
highlighted by participants were within the urban zone of Auckland, mainly the central 
business district or city fringe. 
2.2 Participants 
Participants were sought to represent the perspectives of architects and design consultants, 
project managers, construction companies, and project alliances. These roles were chosen 
because they represent key stake holders in the industry in relation to the projects 
developed within the RWC context. Seven of the individuals approached agreed to take part, 
as follows: two directors of architectural firms, two project managers, a director of a 
construction company, a public relations/environment manager for a construction alliance, 
and an engineer.  
3. Projects and impacts 
Projects in Auckland that were undertaken for the RWC can be divided into two categories. 
Core projects are those which were essential to the tournament, including work which was 
contractually required as part of the hosting agreement. These included: 
  
• Eden Park stadium redevelopment 
• Eden Park precinct - upgrades to rail network, stations, pedestrian access. 
Catalyst projects are projects which were either initiated or brought forward to improve the 
city’s image or amenities to take advantage of the increased publicity of the RWC. These 
included: 
• Queens Wharf – structural upgrade to the wharf, redevelopment of Shed 10 and 
construction of ‘The Cloud’ events  
• Wynyard Quarter – waterfront developments to create a large public park 
• Central Business District streetscape upgrades 
• Central rail upgrades 
• Newmarket overpass – motorway upgrade. 
3.1 Schedules and timeframes 
Participants were questioned on the extent to which projects they were involved with were 
influenced by the hosting of the RWC. Participants believed that most of the projects carried 
out under the auspices of the RWC were within the plans for Auckland’s development, but 
considered that if it were not for the RWC these projects would not have been initiated within 
the projected timeframes. Participants agreed that “the RWC provided a definite deadline” 
and considered that overall it was a good thing for the projects.  
Table 2 provides a summary of some of the projects that were affected by the RWC. The 
start date of the majority of projects was brought forward, but the physical design was not 
changed to suit the event. Most projects were upgrades of existing facilities as opposed to 
being new construction. 
There was some disagreement between participants about whether projects were “fast 
tracked”, with most preferring the term “brought forward”, stating that it was only the start 
dates of projects that were changed and not the process of construction that was sped up. 
This however was contradicted by their own descriptions of the impacts of the RWC on the 
planning and construction process. Many used the term “fast track” to talk about the 
expedited consents process, and again to describe parallel execution of construction tasks 
adopted to meet the deadline, as opposed to the more usual sequential progression.  
  
Table 2 Impact of RWC on identified projects 
Project New project/  
event based 
Fast tracked/ 
brought 
forward 
Upgraded 
existing 
project/ facility 
Existing plans 
Eden Park and precinct      
Queens Wharf (incl. The Cloud)     
Newmarket (SH1) Overpass      
Wynyard Quarter      
Transport system      
Kiwi Rail      
Streetscape projects      
 
Several of the projects that were discussed were seen to have “come to a stop at kickoff”, 
meaning that only some phases of the project had been completed prior to the opening of 
the RWC. Most of these projects were part of the long term plan for the city’s development 
initiated by local government, but the start dates were brought forward. The ongoing 
development and completion of the further project phases has not been carried out but is still 
projected. Some of these projects may take a further 10-20 years to complete, as stated by 
one of the architects interviewed, and dates for the commencement of future work are still 
undefined. 
Mega events are frequently seen by their supporters as a means to bringing forward long 
term projects that would otherwise have taken a long time to initiate (Malfas et al., 2004). 
This was clearly the case with the RWC in Auckland. All of the participants considered this to 
be an advantage for both the city and the construction industry, “Those projects would have 
happened anyway but just the timing of them may have been slightly different. So the 
RWC has been positive in that respect in that it has pushed or created an end point for 
which projects have to be delivered” (Architect). 
3.2 Consents and approvals processes 
The key benefit identified by all participants was the significant reduction in the time taken by 
planning authorities to process consents and planning applications. It was evident from the 
responses from all the participants that processes did alter and help fast track projects. “One 
of the main things that was changed was the consents and processing time lines. So we 
basically got a dedicated team in council to help fast track any consent issues. Got rid of 
the long processing time lines, if you said this was RWC project it got special emphasis 
on it” (Project Manager).  
Several participants identified that other projects that were planned for construction but were 
not expected to complete before the start of the RWC were either not given consent or were 
put on hold even after consents were issued. This was done so that no major works would 
be carried out around the city, both for safety reasons and so that it would not appear as if 
Auckland was unprepared to host the RWC. Auckland Council imposed a construction 
  
moratorium from mid–August 2011, meaning that all construction work in the city had to 
be completed by that date, and no work was to take place during the RWC. This 
impacted many projects and meant companies had to work long hours in order to meet 
the deadline. Main contractors worked in a more integrated fashion with sub-contractors 
to reach targets, and a lot of weekend work and overtime was done on some projects. 
Specific legislation (Rugby World Cup 2011 Empowering Act 2010) was implemented by the 
Government to expedite planning and approvals for the event. “Time-critical RWC activities 
and facilities will require a wide range of consents, licences, regulatory approvals, and 
temporary waivers (“approvals”) that existing approval processes are not suited to address. 
This is because of the long timeframes needed for some approval processes; the risk of 
capacity constraints arising within some consenting authorities, given the substantial 
increase in consent applications that is anticipated; and the likelihood that urgent approvals 
may be needed to resolve unforeseen circumstances.” (Rendle, 2010). Under the 
requirements of this legislation, the affected territorial authorities were required to provide 
additional administrative support for processing applications. In addition to this there was 
provision for the RWC Authority to override normal planning processes to grant approvals 
where required.  
None of the participants were aware of the relevance of this legislation to their roles. 
However, they had all recognised the unusually fast turnaround period for getting consents 
on both their major projects and other minor projects and upgrades which would have 
normally not been approved so quickly, and on reflection considered that the legislation 
could have been the reason why Council acted so quickly on the consents. All participants 
agreed that “any project that had the RWC tag on it” was given priority in terms of consents 
issued over other projects, and the conclusion was that the legislation had been taken 
advantage of without the knowledge of most stakeholders. “I am not aware of any particular 
changes to the planning process. Apart from the fact the Government stepped in and 
took over Queens Wharf and they managed that process. I suppose there was more 
high level Government influence on the planning processes for parts of the RWC 
infrastructure” (Architect). 
3.3 Planning processes 
Because most of the projects involved in the RWC were previously part of the city’s 
development plans or based on existing facilities, there was little controversy around the 
appropriateness of the urban development that was undertaken. The exception to this was 
around the redevelopment of Eden Park as opposed to a new stadium development, and the 
subsequent debate about the rehabilitation of Queens Wharf. The original plan was for an 
upgraded Eden Park to become the foundation of the RWC match schedule. This was 
disrupted in 2006 when the Government proposed a new showcase stadium on Auckland’s 
waterfront. Following a brief but intense period of public debate this idea was put aside in 
favour of the Eden Park upgrade.  
Discussion was reignited with the decision to promote a new development of Queens Wharf 
as “Party Central” for the RWC. The site was bought by the Government and Auckland 
  
Regional Council in 2009 to form a centrepiece for RWC celebrations A public design 
competition was held, which resulted in the selection of eight finalists. A winner was never 
chosen, however, because of intervention from central and local government and the 
decision that the proposed designs were not sufficiently “iconic” to represent the city and 
country in the RWC events. A redevelopment of one of the heritage buildings on the wharf 
was then proposed, along with the creation of “a multi-purpose temporary facility named The 
Cloud” (Key, 2010). 
The government intervention in this development was the main cause of negative feeling 
around the RWC from any of the participants. The possibility of the Government stepping 
in and taking over was perceived to be a risk not just for this situation but in any of the 
RWC projects, and was considered to be damaging to the construction industry as it 
prevented a company from making money as well as showcasing their work, and to the 
build-up to the RWC as it interfered with the proper scheduling and development 
processes.  “The Shed 10 and the Cloud is a compromise and that is middle thinking 
and to be honest with you for a city like Auckland it probably shows a dysfunctional 
relationship between Government and council but at the end of the day every city is 
faced with difficult decisions, it’s just having the leadership to have the confidence to 
actually make those decisions and be confident that they have made the right decisions 
and I don’t think we have the leadership either at local government or council” 
(Architect). Decision making was seen to be ad hoc and with no co-ordinated planning 
process. 
Hiller (2006) suggests that the process of using high profile events and public funds to drive 
development in this way can create a breach with the normal planning processes, as 
occurred in this particular RWC project. Many participants considered this project to be a 
missed opportunity with the wrong processes followed for the underlying planning of the 
development, “If we were pitching to go for the international events, whether it be RWC 
or Commonwealth games or that kind of scenario, we should have had a lot more 
forethought” (Construction director). 
3.4 Design and construction processes 
All participants recognised the impact that the tight deadlines had had on design and 
construction processes. Consultants had to work quickly to complete designs, and in many 
cases design and construction processes were done in parallel instead of the more usual 
sequential approach. Participants considered it to be inevitable that this time pressure had a 
negative effect on design and construction innovation. One architect identified that most of 
the projects he was involved with had to be procured quickly and methods of construction 
had to be ones that had been proved efficient because of the definite finish dates. “There 
were absolute fixed times for the work to be done so that affected the contractors in terms of 
organising their labour and materials to be delivered absolutely on time”. The potential risk 
involved in adopting novel approaches, sourcing new materials or even in appointing 
unfamiliar contractor or sub-contractor organisations was considered too great in the 
majority of projects. ‘The Cloud’ development on Queens Wharf was one notable exception 
  
to this conservatism, where the innovative design and construction were made possible 
through “months of detailed planning and consultation” once the project got underway. 
The transport and roading projects had the longest time frames of all the RWC projects, 
having been in progress for over three years prior to the start of the RWC. Despite the long 
lead time, the project alliance representative stated that they had to factor all of their 
planning processes around the RWC dates. To be sure of outcomes, they spent the last two 
and a half years (prior to the games) having conversations with all stakeholders, to make 
sure that stakeholder expectations and Alliance plans were in tandem. “We had to make 
sure that we were totally aware of what was being planned for the Rugby World Cup and 
that we could terminate our work around those days. Black days, gray days, rainy days, 
snow days. Nothing could be left to the last minute so all processes were streamlined and 
ran a tight schedule.” (Alliance representative). 
3.5 Urban environment 
The land selected for development as a result of mega events is often obsolete or 
deteriorating, and such events have been seen as a potential to aid in the transformation or 
regeneration of the urban environment (Hiller 2006). Central city locations are preferred over 
distant suburbs because hosting such events requires visitor infrastructure to be put in 
central areas or maybe refurbished (Hiller 2006). Again, this point was illustrated in Auckland 
with the development of the waterfront in particular. The “tank farm” that was part of the 
Ports of Auckland prior to the development of Wynyard Quarter was considered an 
eyesore, whereas “now with the restaurants and playground it has given Auckland a new 
life. I think it’s all come together and I think it’s all a critical mass and I think Auckland 
has greatly benefitted from that.” (Architect). 
D’Arcy (2006) suggests that developments resulting from mega events are likely to alter the 
advantages of certain areas in the city, with rezoning resulting in land values and property 
prices shifting. He goes on to say that is vital that investment in infrastructure is done in a 
way that does not hinder the progress of established areas. Malfas et al. (2004) also points 
out that development undertaken in order to host a mega event may hinder other projects, 
because so much of the available funds or resources are channelled into one city or a limited 
focus of development. This concept was touched on by one of the participants in relation to 
the size of the investment into Eden Park stadium and precinct, noting that, “I still don’t think 
it’s a good idea, having a stadium in suburbia was never a good idea…the entire 
infrastructure was downtown.” (Construction director). However, in general the participants 
were positive about the resulting development of Auckland. The investment was seen as 
sufficiently diverse that there were benefits to many parts of the city, particularly in relation to 
transport improvements, “Transport systems were improved and in the long term they will 
be still used. The trains have been upgraded and soon will all be electrified. The 
motorways were upgraded again, something that will beneficial in the short to long term.” 
(Engineer). 
As claimed by Essex and Chalkley (1999), mega events may help to strengthen regional 
traditions and values whilst increasing local pride and community spirit. This was certainly 
  
the over-riding opinion of the development undertaken in Auckland for the RWC. “I 
overheard somebody saying “this is great, it’s just like being abroad, like being in a 
proper world class city.” (Architect).   
4. Conclusions 
All of the development projects that took place in Auckland during the time between the RFU 
winning the bid to host the RWC and the start of the tournament were in some way affected 
by the RWC. The majority of projects highlighted as RWC developments were already part 
of the city’s long term development plans, and the hosting of the RWC brought forward their 
timelines. Projects were completed in a much shorter timeframe than would otherwise have 
been the case, and several of the projects would have taken another 10 years or more to 
come to fruition. 
In order to meet tight deadlines, planning, design and construction work was carried out in 
parallel rather than sequentially. Procurement processes had to happen more quickly and 
consultants were on the jobs sooner. Council improved the turnaround time of planning and 
consenting processes significantly, and project participants also improved their performance.  
In most cases, projects stayed with well-established design concepts, methods of 
construction and known construction contractors and sub-contractors. A lot of overtime and 
weekend work was required in order to deliver projects as required. 
Few negative impacts were identified, but most were focused on the development process of 
the Queens Wharf regeneration, the only project which was not already part of the city’s plan 
or based on an upgrade of existing facilities. All of the interviewees were critical of the 
Government’s intervention in this project, which they considered to have complicated the 
planning process unnecessarily and to have had a detrimental impact on the time and 
choices available to Auckland in making choices around use of the waterfront. This project 
was seen as a missed opportunity. It is interesting to note that the only other negative point 
made, that the tight timeframe imposed by the RWC deadline reduced creativity and 
opportunities to explore innovative design or construction solutions, did not apply to the 
Cloud development which was seen as original and inventive. 
On the whole, the impact of the RWC on Auckland’s performance while hosting the 
tournament and on its contribution to the city’s future was seen as extremely positive. The 
resulting urban development was regarded to be “world class”. The planning and associated 
processes were also considered to have been very successful and operated well within the 
time constraints imposed. 
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